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Financial Developments in Korea
Over the past 25 years, Korea has had one of
the\\iorld's fastest growing economies, with real
output growth averaging more than nine percent
a year. Although this success has stimulated con-
siderable interest in Korea's trade and develop-
ment policies, relatively less is known about
Korea's policies toward the financial sector.
Korea's experience with the financial sector is of
particular interest because it illustrates the poten-
tial costs of highly interventionist government
policies in financial markets, as well as how
problems caused by such policies may be over-
come. The development of Korea's financial
sector also is of interest to foreign investors, who
are scheduled to gain greater access to Korean
financial markets in the next few years. This
Letter reviews developments in Korea's financial
sector since the mid-1970s.
Financial intervention
Until the early 1980s, Korea's financial sector
was severely restricted. Most funds were chan-
neled through the government-owned banking
sector. Government regulations dictated deposit
and loan rates that effectively subsidized priority
sectors, and credit guidelines placed rigid limits
on the allocation of financial resources. These
policies were a key component of a government
plan in the 1970s to foster the growth of chemi-
cal and other heavy industries through easy
credit to these sectors.
Such policies discouraged financial devel-
opment, however. Financial markets became
segmented into a regulated sector and a rapidly-
growing, unregulated curb market. Even with the
rise of the curb market, investment options re-
mained limited. Thus, although rising inflation in
the late 1970s prompted savers to turn from the
regulated sector, where they earned below-
market rates of interest, to the much riskier curb
market, the limited alternatives of negative real
returns (after adjusting for inflation) or very high
risk probably helped to discourage private sav-
ing. Insufficient private saving, in turn, spurred
the rapid growth in Korea's external debt as a way
to finance rising investment spending in this
period.
Over time, financial policies also contributed
to inefficient resource allocation. Because of
selective credit policies and segmented financial
markets, viable projects by small- and medium-
sized enterprises could not find financing, while
massive,and in many cases unprofitable, heavy-
industry ventures went forward.
Financial policies also distorted balance sheets.
Industrial conglomerates became excessively
leveraged, which increased their vulnerability to
business cycles and made them heavily depen-
dent on government support. By 1980, the debt-
equity ratio of the manufacturing sector in Korea
had risen to nearly five, compared to four in
Japan, two in Taiwan and one in the u.s. The
banking sector also became vulnerable, as funds
to support designated industries dominated loan
portfolios.
The disadvantages of government financial
policies became apparent in the late 1970s as
inflation began to rise. Rapidly rising inflation
impaired the competitiveness of Korean firms,
contributing to slower growth, and to large
increases in external deficits and indebtedness.
The resulting stagflation, which culminated in a
drought-induced recession in 1980, prompted a
reassessment of economic policies in the early
1980s. As a result, the government instituted a
remarkably successful disinflation program,
implemented by curtailing credit and investment
spending. Inflation fell from 29 percent in 1980
to seven percent by 1982, while high output
growth rates were maintained.
In addition, a shift in attitude occurred in favor
of reduced government intervention in the econ-
omy and greater reliance on market forces. In
financial markets, this policy shift has meant that
distortions in the cost and allocation of credit
have diminished, and markets have become
deeper and more integrated.
Reduced distortions
Distortions favoring large borrowers were sig-
nificantly reduced in the early 1980s as a result
of several developments. First, disinflation helped
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to narrow differentials in loan rates. Second, the
government phased out preferential interest rates
on bank loans to priority sectors and began limit-
ing bank lending to large conglomerates, thereby
enabling smaller firms to obtain bank credit.
A third development that helped eliminate
distortions in financial markets was the rapid
growth of Korea's capital markets, which pro-
vided an alternative source of funds and reduced
the importance of the banking sector. By limiting
the growth of bank credit in the early 1980s, the
government's disinflationary policy encouraged
lenders and borrowers to turn to non-bank
financial institutions (NSFls) and to the bond,
commercial paper, and (more recently) equity
instruments intermediated by NBFls. (Funds did
not shift to the curb market because disinflation
limited the interest-rate spread that favored the
curb market over the regulated market, and a
series of scandals in 1982 increased the per-
ceived risk of investing in the curb market.)
To facilitate growth in capital markets, the
government lowered barriers to entry for NBFls
(partially in the early 1980s, and fully in Decem-
ber 1988). More recently, it privatized Korea's
stock exchange, relaxed restrictions on securities
firms, and undertook measures to encourage
firms to go publicor to raise funds in domestic
capital markets in order to reduce their depend-
ence on bank debt.
Another reason for the rapid growth in Korea's
capital markets is that until very recently, com-
mercial banks remained subject to a variety of
restrictions. Although banks were privatized in
the early 1980s, restrictions on loan rates and.on
longer-term deposits were not liberalized until
December 1988. Banks also were constrained by
government involvement in credit decisions, reg-
ulations dictating the pace of repayment of bank
loans, and the requirement that banks hold large
amounts of monetary stabilization bonds which
pay below-market rates of interest. The resulting
lack of development ofthe banking sector is.re-
flected in the absence of an effective interbank
market or short-term money markets in Korea.
Depth and integration
The growing importan<;:e of comparatively less
regulated capital markets and the curtailment of
biases in the cost and allocation of bank credit
have led to deeper and more fully integrated
financial markets, despite the absence of short-
term financial markets in Korea. Financial deep-
ening is evident in the increasing use of financial
assets in the economy; the ratio of broad money
to GNP rose from 39 percent in 1975 to 94 per-
cent in 1987.
The remarkable growth in the stock market is
another indicator of the growing depth of finan-
cial markets. In 1988, for the very first time,
financing through the securities market exceeded
financing through bank borrowing, and the total
market value of stocks rose to Won 64.5 trillion
(US $88 billion), compared to around Won 3.3
trillion in 1982. The rapid increase in stock mar-
ket values reflects a doubling in the number of
shareholders in 1988, increased liquidity, and
government measures to dampen real estate
speculation that have shifted funds (and specula-
tion) to equity markets. At the end of July 1988,
the Korean stock market was the 13th largest
equity market in the world, and after Taiwan,
the second largest in the developing world.
Increased financial market integration is
suggested by more equal access to borrowing in
different sectors, and more equal costs of bor-
rowing-a sharp contrast to the highly seg-
mented financial markets of the 1970s. A 1986
study by Cho and Cole at the Harvard Institute
for International Development indicates that
small and medium firms have enjoyed slightly
better access to credit than large firms since
1982, while heavy industries now have about the
same access as light industries do.
Furthermore, in the 1980s, the gap between bank
loan rates and the (higher) lending rates in other
credit markets fell, leading to smaller variations
in the average cost of credit for different classes
of borrowers. These developments apparently
helped to equalize the average rate of return on
capital across different sectors in the 1980s, sug-
gesting the efficiency of resource allocation may
have improved.
Reduced dependence on bank loans
In line with the deepening and growing inte-
gration of Korean financial markets, bank and
corporate balance sheets have undergone sig-
nificant restructuring in recent years. To a large
extent, government policies deliberately have
encouraged this. For example, as noted above,
the government began limiting bank lending to
large conglomerates in the early 1980s. More
aggressive measures were taken in 1987 and
1988, when the government instructed heavily
indebted companies to accelerate the repayment
of their bank loans by raising funds in capital
markets. When it was appropriate, companies
were encouraged to "go public!' Companies fail-
ing to meet repayment targets were restricted
from replacing maturing borrowings.
Corporate loan repayments in 1987 and 1988
represented around two percent of the total loans
and discounts outstanding of deposit money
banks in each of those two years, and totalled
Won 1,620 billion (about US $2 billion). Funds
were raised primarily through new stock issues or
the issuance of convertible bonds. Partly as a
result, debt-equity ratios in the manufacturing
sector have declined from apeak of 4.9 in 1980
to around 3.4 in 1986 and 1987.
These measures also have changed the direction
of bank lending and produced a significant re-
structuring of bank balance sheets. The share of
the top 30corporate groups in total bank bor-
rowing fell from 25 percent in 1986 to around
19 percent in the first half of 1988. (The share in
total borrowing of the five biggest conglomerates
also fell from 15 percent to 11 percent over the
period.) In part, this decline in lending to large
firms reflects a reshuffling of bank portfolios, as
banks have participated in the acquisition of new
corporate stock and bond issues.
Reinvigorating the banking sector
The financial policy mistakes of the 1970s
imposed a very high cost on the banking sector.
In 1987, bank loans to 78 bankrupt companies
totalled Won 6,800 billion (about US$ 8.3 billion
at then prevailing exchange rates), or nearly 16
percent of total loans and discounts held by
deposit money banks. Of this amount, Won 986
billion were written off as bad debts owed by
four of the largest business groups, which were
dissolved. And interest and principal totalling
Won 5,830 billion were rescheduled for periods
as long as 30 years.
Nevertheless, bank share values have soared
over the past two years. One reason is that the
government (albeit with increasing reluctance)
has played a major role in bailouts to bankrupt
companies, to the benefit of some bank creditors.
Another reason is stronger bank financial condi-
tions; the net profits of the banking sector
increased 140 percent in 1988 to Won 237 bil-
lion (US $348 million). In addition, banks are
strengthening their capital positions through
billions of dollars in new rights offerings.
The door opens
The development of Korea's financial markets and
the strengthening position of financial institutions
is paving the way for the gradual liberalization of
international capital flows over the next few
years. At present, foreigners are allowed to invest
in Korean firms only through authorized invest-
ment funds or through the purchase of converti-
ble (to equity) Eurobond issues, but restrictions
are being relaxed to permit the issuance of a
wider variety of overseas securities by Korean
funds. Starting this year, moreover, foreign inves-
tors will be able to sell and trade in the domestic
market the shares they acquire through conver-
sion of Eurobond issues. And in 1991, the pro-
ceeds from selling these converted shares may
be used to buy certain Korean stocks in the
domestic securities market.
By 1992, assuming sufficient maturity in financial
markets, foreign investors will be allowed to buy
any stock listed in domestic markets, subject to
investment limits per issue, per person, and on
total volume. The access of foreign securities
companies to Korean capital markets also is be-
ing improved, and by 1991, branch offices and
joint ventures involving such companies will be
allowed on a restricted and reciprocal basis.
If fully implemented, these changes will serve to
integrate Korean financial markets with interna-
tional capital markets and in the process, further
stimulate financial development in Korea. Given
the continued strong performance of the Korean
economy, financial liberalization also should
provide attractive investment opportunities to
foreigners.
Ramon Moreno
Economist
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